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Abstract
SoHo users are increasingly faced with the dilemma of applying appropriate security mechanisms to their
computer with little or no knowledge of which countermeasure will deal with which potential threat. As
problematic as it may seem for individuals to apply appropriate safeguards, individuals with malicious intent are
advancing methods by which malicious software may operate undetected on a target host. Previous research has
identified that there are numerous ways in which malware may go undetected on a target workstation. This paper
examines the quality of malware removal programs currently available on the market, which consumers may use
whilst utilising the Internet. The research suggests that current anti-virus products, whilst able to detect most
recently released malware, still fall short of eliminating the malware and returning the system to its original
state. The paper does not compare or disclose potential flaws within each product; rather it depicts the current
state of anti-virus products.
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INTRODUCTION
It has been argued on numerous occasions that access to the Internet can be beneficial from a financial, social,
recreational and educational perspective. As a result, the number of individuals acquiring Internet access in
Australia alone is steadily increasing. The population in Australia as of August 2008, was just over 21 million,
and of those, just under seven million households had Internet access (ABS, 2008). This is equivalent to
approximately 33 percent of the national population. Unfortunately, individuals may be unaware of the threats
that household computers may be susceptible to whilst using the Internet. Evidence suggests that at any given
moment, approximately 90 percent of households worldwide may have some form of malware on their computer
(Schmidt & Arnett, 2005, p.68).
A recent malware infection affected the International Epilepsy Foundation server which was subjected to a
malware attack (Anonymous, 2006, p.2). The resultant outcome saw visitors machines infected with malware
which would display fast-paced flashing images causing seizures. More recent malware infections have resulted
in the target machine joining a collective botnet and used for malicious purposes, including identity theft and
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. A new malware trend, namely ‘ransomware’ is encrypting
documents, emails, pictures and music on the target host (Bridges, 2008). The aim of this class of malware is to
extort money from the victim by offering to decrypt the contents of the victim’s computer once the lump sum is
paid. Malware affecting consumers is reaching all realms of the online world. Malware is increasingly targeting
users of games such as World of Warcraft in an attempt to capture keystrokes during the login process, with the
intent to steal in-game currency, inventory or accounts (Bridges, 2008, p.18).
Whilst each anti-virus vendor is continually promoting their product and releasing updates (signatures) on an
almost daily basis, consumers are still falling victim to malware attacks. One of the threats facing consumers is
the constant evolution and revolution of malware. Secure Computing (2008) reported a constant increase in
malware propagation over the Internet towards the end of 2007. The analyst’s team stated that “… Microsoft
Windows continued to see a steady increase in exploits while decreases were seen on other platforms…” (Secure
Computing, 2008). This quote emphasises that SoHo Microsoft Windows based hosts are still the predominant
targets for attacks, whilst sabotage and attempted control of the infected host appears to be the main focus of
each attack. This creates a dilemma because users must possess the knowledge and skills to safeguard and
protect their computers from potential online threats.
The various penalties associated with malware development could include financial penalties and/or employment
termination. As a result, there are various methods by which malware may go undetected by employing anti-

forensic techniques to avoid detection and analysis (Brand, 2007). Detection avoidance may be achieved by data
destruction, data hiding, and data contraception. Alternatively, malware may also go through a set of analysis
avoidance methods including: exploiting flaws in analysis tools, system destruction when undergoing analysis,
production of false disassembly listings, and subversion of dissembler heuristics. These anti-forensic methods
are discussed in detail in Brand (2007, pp.1-8). Whilst numerous vendors discuss the advantages of their product
in relation to malware removal, the anti-forensic and anti-avoidance techniques present a new challenge and
hence as a result, not all malware may be detected during a system scan. A concept often overlooked by
performance testing of anti-virus software is examined in this paper, by attempting to determine if recently
released malware is detected and successfully removed from a Microsoft Windows based computer system.
Network based malware takes advantage of vulnerabilities on computers to install malicious software directly, or
can initiate its download from an external, malicious site. The malware is generally packed, and the installation
process usually involves a sequence of installing multiple files in the system directory, together with the creation
and modification of registry keys, resulting in the creation of new malicious processes that are initiated each time
the computer is started. Packing malware provides not only a method of compressing multiple files and
installation instructions into a single file but also an opportunity to avoid signature detection. Most anti-virus
software will simply detect that a file is packed and warn the user that the file is suspicious. The packed malware
generally consists of multiple files which are then copied to various locations in the Windows System directory
with the hidden attribute set and provided with file names that very closely resemble legitimate file names to
provide additional camouflage. Registry changes can include disabling anti-virus and firewall software and the
Microsoft Windows update mechanism. Auto start capabilities are generally changes made to the registry to
ensure that the malware is activated each time the computer is restarted. Security settings are often changed in
Internet Explorer so that more malware can be downloaded from sites without warnings displayed to the user.

METHODOLOGY
The paper depicts the current state of popular anti-virus products in relation to detection statistics provided by a
third party malware analysis group.
Preparation
The test system was comprised of an IBM Pentium 4, 3.0GHz standalone workstation with 1GB of RAM. The
chosen host operating system was Microsoft Windows XP Professional running Virtual PC 2007 as the virtual
machine environment. In turn, the virtual image consisted of Microsoft Windows XP Professional with Service
Pack 3 and all recommend updates from Microsoft up to and inclusive of August 19th 2008. All network
connectivity was removed, resulting in the test machine being isolated from other workstations on the network.
Anti-virus Products
The top ten anti-virus products were downloaded from the Internet according to recommendations made by third
parties (CNET, 2008; Top Ten Reviews, 2008). Locating a list of top products was based on a process that a
SoHo user may utilise to compare and contrast available anti-virus products. As a result the top ten products
were located by using the search terms “anti-virus review” and “top 10 antivirus” in Google and are presented in
Table 1 below.
Table 1 Anti-virus products tested
Anti-Virus Product
Avast
AVG
Bitdefender
Eset Nod32
F-Secure Anti-Virus 2008
Kaspersky
Norman
Norton
Panda
Trend Micro

Version
4.8
8.0.169
2008 build 11.0.8
3.0.672
8.00 build 103
8.0.0.454
2008 build 10.0.0.359
2009
8.910

Product Testing
Each anti-virus product was installed independently on a separate baseline virtual machine image with all
updates being applied to the product up to and inclusive of August 26th 2008. Utilising Regshot (Regshot, 2008),
a snapshot was taken of the registry, the %\Windows and %\System directory of the operating system prior to
the malware executing, after the malware had been installed (to monitor changes to the system files), and after
the malware had been supposedly removed by the anti-virus product. Each malware specimen was executed on
the baseline image via two methods:
1.

Whilst the anti-virus product was disabled and all subsequent monitoring agents terminated.

2.

Whilst the anti-virus product was enabled and hence providing consistent system monitoring.

Results were gathered as to whether each anti-virus product was successfully able to detect the malware
specimen, eliminate the malware and all associated malicious files from the system, and return the system and
associated system files to their original state.

Malware Specimens
Seven malware specimens were used in the course of this research. The following results were extracted from
reports generated by the online malware analysis service Anubis (International Secure Systems Lab, Vienna
University of Technology, Eurecom France, & UC Santa Barbara, 2008) and from Virus Total (2008). Table 2
below lists the malware signatures of the specimens as determined by the Ikarus anti-virus software. Names
assigned to malware can vary widely between products. This can also include different detection results for the
same malware specimen by numerous anti-virus products.
Table 2 Virus signature of specimens assigned by Ikarus

Sample

Virus Signature (Ikarus)

A

Net-Worm.Win32.Allaple.a
Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Small.hib
Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Small.hib
Trojan-PWS.Win32.OnLineGames.kil
Backdoor.Win32.Rbot
Backdoor.Win32.Rbot.cgu
Virus.Win32.Rbot.DCY

B
C
D
E
F
G

Specimen Justification
The malware specimens selected for the research have varying detection rates amongst numerous anti-virus
products. Table 3 displays the detection rates for the specimens after submission through Virus Total to thirty-six
different anti-virus products. Whilst an anti-virus product may make it to the top ten by third party reviewers it
may not actually detect and/or eliminate the malware from an infected host. As depicted by Virus Total, malware
specimen F and G appear to have a 100 percent detection rate amongst all current anti-virus products, whilst
specimen C has the lowest detection rate.
Table 3 Virus Total Anti-virus detection rates
A
94.40%

Malware Specimen Detection Rates
B
C
D
E
F
86.11% 69.44% 97.22% 94.40% 100%

G
100%

The malware chosen for testing encompasses varying degrees of sophistication and anti-avoidance techniques
which any reputable anti-virus product should be capable of removing. Table 4 displays the varying, high level,
functionality of the malware specimens which could include creation of files in the system directory, changing
security settings in Internet Explorer, download of executable code, configure auto-start capabilities and joining
of an IRC network.

Table 4 Sophistication of malware specimens
Malware Specimen

Creates files in the Windows system directory

A

B

C

Yes

Yes

Changes security settings in Internet Explorer

Yes

Downloads executable code

Yes

Autostart capabilities

Yes

Joins an IRC network

Yes

Yes

D

E

F

G

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

The number of malicious files and registry entries created is dependent upon the intention of malware. Table 5
below depicts the number of changes made by the malware specimens used in this research to the registry and to
the file system as well as the number of services changed and processes created. A significant number of
changes are made by each malware specimen. A malware removal process could be expected to remove the
malicious programs, associated files and registry entries by detecting the presence of the malware through some
combination of heuristics and signature matching. However, this technique is dependent upon an analyst having
first analysed the malicious software to extract its signature and determination of the changes to the file system
and the registry the malware makes.
Table 5 Malware characteristics
Malware Specimen
B

C

D

E

F

G

Created

5

0

2

0

8

4

2

Modified

10

21

0

10

41

53

11

Deleted

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

Created

2

7

4

2

0

1

4

Modified

12

13

24

8

3

5

11

Deleted

0

2

2

2

1

1

1

Services Changed

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

Processes Created

1

0

1

1

0

1

3

Files

Registry
Keys

A

Testing
The experimentation was aimed at mimicking the process that a SoHo user would use when installing and using
an anti-virus product. As a result, the default settings were used for each and every product as recommended by
the vendor during the install process. During the detection and elimination of malware stage, the steps taken by
the vendor were also used to remove the malware from the system. If a system scan needed to be conducted, the
depth of the scan was dependent on the recommend scan type outlined by the vendor. Whilst a “recommended”
scan may not detect or eliminate malware as would a “deep scan”, it is the purpose of this paper to mimic the
actions taken by a SoHo user in dealing with a malware infected computer system.

RESULTS
In order to protect the vendor of each anti-virus product, names of the product are not used when describing the
quality of a particular anti-virus product. Rather, each product is referred to as Product 1 through to Product 10
and does not relate to the order of the products presented in Table 1.

Table 6 depicts the malware specimens presented in Table 2 and whether or not they were detected by the antivirus product. In this instance, the anti-virus product had been disabled and any monitoring capabilities of the
product were terminated also, hence preventing the malware from being detected on install. The malware had
been executed and the anti-virus product had been resumed. Product 6 and 7 were able to detect the malware
immediately upon activation with a warning box appearing, notifying the user that a virus had been detected.
The research suggests that although the products tested have made it to the top ten list, they are still not capable
of detecting malware (specimen C) which has been propagating throughout the Internet for a long period of time.
Table 6 Malware Specimens Detected
Product

A

B

C

Malware Specimen
D
E

F

G

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Each anti-virus product provides constant system monitoring to potentially prevent malware from installing
itself, whilst the anti-virus product is active. Whilst numerous vendors promote their product with the added
feature of “real time monitoring”, the research suggests that these monitoring capabilities are far from effective.
As presented in Table 7 the detection capabilities of the malware have improved in contrast to the previous
detection rate. However, the top 10 anti-virus products have clearly not detected malware which has been
available for a long period of time. In most instances when the malware was transferred from a CD to the virtual
machine image, most anti-virus products immediately detected the binary instantly and confirmed whether it
should be quarantined or deleted. From the products which detected the malware, there was no method by which
to make an exception and hence allow the malware specimen to be installed, hence providing good reaction and
detection capabilities.
Table 7 Malware specimens detected during install
Product

A

B

C

Malware Specimen
D
E

F

G

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Table 8 depicts whether the malware had been completely removed from the computer system utilising the
didactic instructions provided by the vendor. The blank spaces depict those products which could not detect the
malware and hence were not able to remove it either. It was discovered that whilst a product may detect and
potentially eliminate a piece of malware from a computer system – that there are always remnants which remain
on the system after the malware has been eliminated.

Table 8 Malware elimination
Product

A

B

C

Malware Specimen
D
E

F

G

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

As is demonstrated by Table 8, those products which were able to detect the malware were not necessarily able
to eliminate the malware from the host. It was soon discovered that malware specimen C was significantly
problematic for most anti-virus products. Whilst the product claimed to have removed the product, and in some
instances needed the host to be restarted – following this didactic process discovered that the malware would reappear as soon as the system was restarted.

CONCLUSION
The research in progress effectively examined the state of the top ten claimed anti-virus products available to
consumers. From the research conducted, the most effective anti-virus product included Kaspersky Anti-Virus
and BitDefender Anti-Virus. This strongly conforms to the results and reviews provided by the third party
websites which detailed their most highly recommend anti-virus product. Whilst numerous factors may be
important when choosing an anti-virus product including ease of update, support and the user interface – it is
however the opinion of the authors that the effectiveness of a product in detecting and removing the malware is
the most prevailing factor.
From a SoHo perspective, the research suggests that naïve or uneducated users will continue to fall victim to the
numerous, predominant threats found on the Internet. Whilst many products do provide instructions by which the
user should follow to eliminate the malware, it appears that in many instances that these instructions are not clear.
This research re-iterates the issue of how difficult it is for a SoHo user to protect themselves when not only are
the product instructions unclear in the steps needed to remove malware, but furthermore when the product itself is
not able to remove the malicious content in the first place.
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